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Abstract. Video game cheats destroy the online play experience of users
and result in financial losses for game developers. Similar to hacking
communities, cheat developers often organize themselves around forums
where they share game cheats and know-how. In this paper, we per-
form a large-scale measurement of two online forums, MPGH and Un-
knownCheats, devoted to video game cheating that are nowadays very
active and altogether have more than 7 million posts. Video game cheats
often require an auxiliary tool to access the victim process, i.e., an injec-
tor. This is a type of program that manipulates the game program mem-
ory, and it is a key piece for evading cheat detection on the client side. We
leverage the output of our measurement study to build a machine learn-
ing classifier that identifies injectors based on their behavioural traits.
Our system will help game developers and the anti-cheat industry to
identify attack vectors more quickly and will reduce the barriers to study
this topic within the academic community.
Keywords: Game Cheating & Hacks · Underground Forums · Injectors.
1 Introduction
There are more than 2 billion video game players worldwide, with many of them
playing online [21]. Games such as Counter Strike: Global Offensive (CS:GO),
released in 2012, still attract more than 600K monthly average players.4 Most
modern video games also include ranking systems that prompt players to com-
pete to get more content and features. They also offer access to exclusive in-game
events, that in some cases are used as an entry point for professional e-sports.
While most players compete using their ability and experience, others use
game hacks and cheats to gain advantages against their competitors. Cheating
in online games undermines legitimate player’s efforts, reduces their engagement
in the game, and results in financial losses [9]. To mitigate this, most modern
games include anti-cheat software that continuously monitors the state of the
game (or the system where the game runs) in the look for cheats. This has
resulted in an arms race between cheaters and game developers.
4 Data extracted from https://steamcharts.com/app/730 on 16th April 2021.
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Video game cheaters interact in online underground forums to share knowl-
edge, and trade products and services, similar to other online communities fo-
cused on illicit and even illegal activities [14, 24, 1, 20, 27]. Communities dedi-
cated to game cheats include a range of topics that go from cheating tutorials
and documentation to the trading and free-sharing of cheating programs that
can work with the latest game versions.
In this work, we conduct a measurement on two of the largest English-
speaking online communities (forums) dedicated to game cheating: Multiplayer
Game Hacking (MPGH)5 and UnknownCheats (UC)6. These communities have
been continuously operating since 2007. Our study provides a bi-dimensional
view of the ecosystem, using both: i) social data science techniques on the fo-
rum data, and ii) binary analysis of files released for free. In a nutshell, we first
shed light on how these communities are structured, the type of cheats and tools
being developed, the actors involved, and the games they target. We observe
that a cornerstone component of this ecosystem relies on stealthy techniques de-
sign to inject cheats into the games’ program memory. Accordingly, we leverage
information from our measurement to build a classifier to detect such injectors.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study focusing on longitudinal
data on game cheats covering multiple games, years, and cheating communities
(see §4). In particular, our work makes the following contributions:
– We analyze two of the most popular communities that focus on the trad-
ing and sharing of hacks and cheats using a novel methodology (see §2).
Specifically, we apply social network analysis to describe the relationships
and interests of the forum users (as shown in §3.3).
– We build a machine learning classifier to quickly identify injectors used to
execute cheats within games. Our classifier uses features extracted from the
static and dynamic analysis of binaries and is able to correctly classify 91%
of the 632 test samples (§3.2).
– We discuss how our work could be used to help anti-cheat analysts and
discuss the limitations involved when analysing these communities (§5).
2 Methodology
We rely on data gathered from two well-known English communities dedicated to
video game hacks and cheats to perform an analysis of the cheating ecosystem.
In particular, we analyse how users share and distribute cheats, the type of
files being shared, and the demographics and interests of such users. We then
focus our analysis on files that feature code injecting capabilities. These kinds of
files, normally known as injectors, are a key component of the cheats ecosystem,
as they are needed to inject the actual cheat payload into the game’s process
memory. As part of our framework, we also develop a method to quickly identify
5 https://www.mpgh.net/
6 https://www.unknowncheats.me/
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cheat injectors based on their static and dynamic characteristics, using, among
others, features commonly shared with malware.
Figure 1 presents an overview of the pipeline used for our analysis. Our
framework starts with the data collection and pre-processing of the forum data
obtained from the two online communities that are part of our analysis: MPGH
and UC (§2.1). Once the data is collected and pre-processed, we analyze the
content of each forum post and its corresponding attachments. These two anal-
yses are done independently. On the one hand, the post analysis focuses on the
relationships between users and video game cheats (§2.2). On the other hand,
the attachment analysis looks into the kind of files that are shared by these
communities for cheating purposes (§2.3), with a specific focus on attachments
used to inject the cheats in the games’ processes (§2.4).
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Fig. 1: Steps taken to process the posts and the attachments from the forums.
2.1 Data collection
Acquiring data from some online communities is a daunting task. We use data
from the CrimeBB dataset [25], available from the Cambridge Cybercrime Cen-
tre7. While this dataset contains data from various underground forums, we focus
on two popular English forums for video game hacks and cheats,i.e., Multi Player
Game Hacking (MPGH) and UnknownCheats (UC). Our methodology is specifi-
cally designed to cover both MPGH and UC as provided by the CrimeBB dataset.
However, it can be adapted to other data sources such as non-preprocessed fo-
rums or other online communities. Our dataset includes over a decade of posts
7 https://www.cambridgecybercime.uk.
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as of June 2020, totaling more than 9M posts made in 767K threads by 511K
actors in MPGH, and 1.8M posts made in 120K threads by 184K actors in UC8.
Both forums are organized around the main index page that hosts several sub-
forums grouped in categories and sub-categories. For MPGH, all game forums
are grouped under the “MultiPlayer Game Hacks & Cheats” category. For UC
the categories group together game genres, e.g.: shooters, strategy, etc. The sub-
categories match games or games from the same franchise (e.g., the Call of Duty
franchise has 14 different games at the time of writing this paper). In both cases,
the communities have other non-game-related forums covering a great variety of
topics that go from programming to other topics outside the gaming domain.
Additionally, MPGH provides specific sub-forums and marketplaces, where users
can trade their hacks and cheats, and also other gaming-related goods such as
virtual items, accounts, or tutorials.
Besides the text obtained from the posts, our system also analyzes the re-
sources (cheats and auxiliary tools) shared in the forum. Both communities allow
users to share files in the form of attachments (internal links to hosted resources).
Links used to share attachments follow a specific format, and are thus labeled
with the tag ***ATTACHMENT*** in the CrimeBB dataset. For this work, we
have developed a custom crawler that automatically scrapes the text from the
posts, extracts the URL of the links, and downloads all the attachments9.
2.2 Post Analysis
Analyzing forum data is of particular interest for this research, since it provides
both the context and metadata about the attachments (e.g. timestamp, game,
accompanying explanations, etc.), and also the impact or popularity of the cheat
providers in the community (e.g. number of downloads, reputation of the actor,
number of replies, etc.) Since the dataset spans more than 15 years, processing
this data allows conducting a longitudinal analysis to analyze the evolution of the
interests and discussions in the community. Accordingly, we have applied specific
techniques used to analyze social media data. Concretely, we use text mining
to understand the topics covered in the posts, and Social Network Analysis
(SNA) to understand the roles, connections, and social interactions of the actors
releasing cheats.
Game annotation Both communities have special sub-forums dedicated to
releases and requests of hacks and cheats for each game. These typically have the
structure “[GAME TITLE] hacks and cheats”. Accordingly, we annotate these
sub-forums and map them to the referred game, by manually looking at forum
titles and extracting the particular game where possible. For this, we used our
8 In the remainder of the paper, we use the terms ‘user’ and ‘actor’ indistinguishably
to refer a forum account uniquely identified by a user ID.
9 As a result of our work, these attachments have been included in the CrimeBB
catalog, and are thus available for other researchers under a legal agreement with
the Cambridge Cybercrime Centre.
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own domain knowledge obtained from studying other gaming platforms such
as Steam10 and other gaming-specific media websites and online shops. This
resulted in 238 games being identified overall from a set of 630 forums. We
discard posts belonging to other forums. These may include posts that we would
classify as releases but are not related to a particular game.
Social Network Analysis To understand the relevance and impact of the
cheats and also the interests of cheat providers, we conduct a Social Network
Analysis on the forum data. First, for each community, we build a directed
graph G = {U, I} that represents the historical interactions (I) of the users (U).
Specifically, each pair of nodes ui, uj ∈ U are connected by an edge eij(w) ∈ I
where w is the number of times that the user ui responded or interacted with a
post of user uj . Then, we extract classical network centrality measures (degree,
in-degree, out-degree and eigenvector) to analyze the impact and relevance of
each user in the community. Additionally, we look for posts and threads related
to the actual trading of virtual items, goods and services. For this analysis,
we focus on the MPGH community, since it provides dedicated boards for the
market. We count the number of posts made by cheat providers on these boards,
which gives us an indicator of the economic activities of actors that are releasing
cheats for free.
2.3 Attachment Analysis
We annotate every attachment with the corresponding game according to the
board where it is shared. For each attachment where a cheat is released, we
extract information about the posts where it was released11. Concretely we an-
notate the actor, the timestamp, whether a post is starting a new thread or if
it has been a response to another post (e.g. a request), the number of replies
to this post, the number of downloads of the attachment, and the game associ-
ated to the post. In most cases, multiple files related to a cheat are embedded
into an archived file (e.g. zip or rar). In those cases, we annotate both, the zip
file and the extracted files to the same forum. We recursively uncompressed all
archive files, using a custom-made password cracking tool to inspect password-
protected files. This tool scans the text from the post where the attachment is
released, looks for a password reference, and saves all the successful passwords
found in a passwords list. This list is used as a dictionary and all the entries are
tested until the file is successfully uncompressed. All archive files that can not
be uncompressed are discarded.
Apart from the context (i.e. forum-related data), for each attachment, we
annotate the following information: the attachment name, its file type, a crypto-
graphic hash (sha256), the author that posted the file, the number, and the list
of files in the archive if the file is compressed, if the file contains an executable,
if there is encryption, and the entropy [29]. Filetypes are obtained either by
10 https://store.steampowered.com Accessed on 10th May 2021.
11 Some attachments are duplicated or re-released in different posts.
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looking at the file extension or by interpreting their magic number using the
tool libmagic. Initial exploratory analysis showed that various files within the
attachments were not directly related to the actual cheats. These are files used
either as auxiliary tools or game and system files used as backups to recover
from a corrupted version. To identify these, we look for all windows binary files
(exe and dll) that are digitally signed. We analysed all digital certificates and
found that none of them belonged to a cheat developer (they were related to
trusted developers such as Microsoft, Adobe, etc.). Because of this, we remove
these files from the analysis and classify the remaining files into a global category
of executable files with sub-categories depending on their kind (Java, Python,
PE file, etc.)
2.4 Injector Classifier
An initial analysis of the executable files and their corresponding posts revealed
that many of them were not actual cheats. As mentioned earlier, while these
forums are focused on game cheating, they also include boards related to other
topics such as programming, graphics, etc. Our initial exploratory analysis also
showed that most of the game boards included several releases that were focused
on cheat injection. These ‘injectors’ or ‘loaders’ can be used by other cheat
developers to inject their cheats into the game memory, allowing them to focus
on the cheating behaviour rather than on how to get the cheat into the game.
Identifying these injectors quickly can allow game developers to fix or improve
the detection capabilities of their anti-cheat engines sooner, reducing the window
the game is susceptible to a particular cheat. Because of this, we decide to
focus the rest of our analysis on these files. In particular, we develop a machine
learning-based classifier capable of detecting if a particular binary has injecting
capabilities. For this, we collect a series of injectors as ground truth, we extract
static and dynamic properties, build a random tree-based classifier using 5-fold
cross-validation.
Ground Truth Collection We have conducted further filtering over the
45,338 executables to identify cheat-related attachments solely focusing on in-
jecting or loading cheats in-game memory. We shortlisted a dataset of 2,543 in-
jectors by inspecting the filename and looking for keywords like injector, loader
and injektor. After keyword matching against the filename, a manual inspection
of the files was conducted to validate the dataset.
To further validate the injector dataset, we use PEfile12 to extract the func-
tions and libraries imported, and also to extract strings from the binaries. Then,
we match these extracted symbols against a list of methods known to be asso-
ciated with code injection. The list of methods was created from the following
sources: i) Feng et al. [10] described in 2008 a list of methods associated with
game cheat injection; ii) A book by Nick Cano that includes and extends the
methods [4] published in 2016; and iii) the tool Capa, an open-source security
12 https://github.com/erocarrera/pefile Accessed on 10th May 2021.
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framework from FireEye that automatically identifies malware capabilities from
binaries [12], and which includes some of the previously mentioned methods in
their set of rules relevant to process injection. Overall our analysis includes 66
methods relevant to injection.
To train our model we include a negative class with files that are not injectors.
To achieve this, we include binary files that contain as much diverse behaviours
as possible. We use the files extracted from the NIST NSRL database [30] as
our negative class files. This database collects signatures of known and traceable
software applications that are meant to reduce the complexity of law enforcement
and cooperate investigations, and therefore are expected to have a diverse set of
behaviours without including cheat-injection characteristics.
Feature Extraction Game cheats, and injectors in particular, are binary files
obtained from untrusted sources (the forums we analyse). In the context of game
cheating, injectors are programs designed with the purpose of loading and exe-
cuting the cheat’s code, either in the game memory or in a third party library
used by the game. Due to the growth of anti-cheat technologies, these injec-
tors implement techniques to remain stealthy and evade detection, such as code
obfuscation or encryption of the injector’s binary. The analysis of obfuscated
code is hard and time consuming. Thus the classifier is trained using features
derived from both static and dynamic analysis information. To get these fea-
tures, we rely on existing information from VirusTotal (VT)13. We observe that,
in order to improve the trustworthiness of their files and to probe that their
cheats are safe, cheat providers often upload their binaries to VT, and link the
corresponding report in their release post. We take advantage of this behaviour
to obtain and extract static and dynamic features for our dataset. We query
VT for behavioural reports from our set of injectors and non-injector files. Out
of the 2,543 injectors, 1,426 produced behavioural reports containing dynamic
analysis information. The behavioural reports along with the static information
get parsed and converted into a feature matrix consisting of injectors (samples)
as rows and information taken from the reports and static analysis as columns
(features). In a similar way, we query VT for reports from non-injector files ob-
tained from the NIST NSRL database. We obtain 1,731 reports that include all
our required features. This means that our ground truth set consists of 1,426
injectors and 1,731 non-injectors (good-ware) files. All the files included in the
dataset are unique as they have been filtered using their SHA-1 signature.
We group all our features in 7 categories: file operations, registry changes,
processes & mutexes, services, functions, strings, and others (which includes a
variety of features that cannot be grouped around a common theme). Table 1
shows the number of features from each category. We use one-hot encoding for
all our features, except for the number of processes created which is numerical.
As an example, each possible loaded module corresponds to a specific feature
(e.g. ole32.dll) with a value of 1 if the module is actually being loaded by the
13 https://www.virustotal.com Accessed on 10th May 2021.
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binary and 0 otherwise. We provide more detailed information about the features
in Appendix A.
Analysis Class Number of features
File Operations 8,068
Registry Changes 5,440
Strings 5,161
Processes & Mutexes 1,101
Functions 398
Services 44
Other 214
Table 1: Summary of the features extracted from the ground truth collection
using one-hot encoding.
Model creation and validation We use the ground-truth extracted to train a
classification model. The accuracy of the model was calculated using K-fold cross-
validation [26], with K = 5. The dataset was randomly divided to 70% training
data and 30% test data. The performance of the model was measured using
the f-score which takes into account the precision and recall for each class [6].
We tested different classification algorithms, i.e., SVM, random trees and neural
networks, obtaining similar performances. Thus, for our experiments, we used
an extremely randomized trees classifier [3]. The classifier’s accuracy was tested
with a different number of trees, with no significant change in performance. The
performance results of our injector classifier are described in §3.2 along with a
bias analysis.
3 Results
In this section, we present the results of our analysis. We start with a dataset
characterization, including the type of files released in the cheats. We continue
analyzing the performance of the injector classifier, and some case studies for
injectors detected in our dataset. Finally, we present the results obtained from
the analysis of the forums, including the demographics of the actors involved, as
well as the activity related to the trading of a subset of actors that release more
cheats and more injectors.
3.1 Dataset Characterization
Table 2 summarizes our dataset. In MPGH there are 86,789 posts with links
to attachments, from which we have obtained 168,096 links and downloaded
160,991 attachments (some of the links were duplicated or death links). From
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these, 119,715 (74.3%) corresponded to images and thus were excluded from the
analysis. From the remaining, 376 files were not processed; 10 files consisting
of password-protected files which were not cracked by our password cracking
tool (§2.3), 197 files were corrupted and 130 were multi-archives. In UC there
are 16,836 posts from where we have downloaded 21,265 attachments (images
excluded). A total of 146 files were not processed; 75 archives were skipped as
they were multi-part and 71 were corrupted.
MPGH UC
Structure
Forums 752 227
Cheat Forums 555 140
Games 191 118
Actors 511,440 184,568
Threads in Overall 449,832 85,454
game forums With attachments 31,705 4,552
Posts in Overall 5,809,108 1,203,745
game forums With attachments 36,688 7,049
Table 2: Summary of the data extracted from the Multiplayer Game Hacks
(MPGH) and the UnknownCheats (UC) forums.
Out of all the data collected, we focus our analysis on forums that are ded-
icated to discussing specific games as indicated by the title of the forum, e.g.
Fortnite Hacks & Cheats. We have mapped 630 forums to 309 game-specific fo-
rums out of a total of 238 unique games (see Table 2). We thus filter out attach-
ments posted in forums not related to particular games (11,854 attachments).
Overall, we see 5.6M game-related posts and 35K attachments in MPGH, and
1.4M posts and 7K attachments in UC.
Figure 2 shows the top 10 games in the last two years judging by the number
of posts discussing each game. The total volume of posts in MPGH is much
higher but is decreasing, while in UC it remains stable. This suggests that UC is
becoming the principal community for cheats. Moreover, while it is more visible
for UC, both communities experienced an increase in the number of posts since
the beginning of March 2020. This matches the time when COVID-19 related
lockdowns were imposed globally, and it is consistent with existing reports that
show an increase in cheating activity by means of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
during the lockdown period [8]. When looking at individual games, we see that
CS:GO is the most popular game in the two communities.
Table 3 provides a more detailed breakdown of the different file types found
in the attachments. The EXE category includes all sorts of executable files,
including MS-DOS, scripts, ELF and COFF (Unix), LSB, and Mach-O files.
An insight that can be directly obtained from these results is the focus of each
community: UC users are more interested in technical discussions around cheats,
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Fig. 2: Top 10 games by number of posts in UnknownCheats (left) and MPGH
(right) from January 2018 until May 2020.
and thus they widely share the source code used to create cheats (e.g. 44% of
the files from UC are C/C++ files, as opposed to MPGH where only 6% are of
these types).
MPGH UC MPGH UC
Total(%) Total(%) Total(%) Total(%)
Documents 363,167(37.4) 150,290(37.3) DLL 21,760(2.2) 7,273(1.8)
Data file 164,293(16.9) 17,964(4.5) Multimedia 20,825(2.1) 3,493(0.9)
Image 163,369(16.8) 10,513(2.6) Game files 14,349(1.4) 4,100(1.0)
Java 59,779(6.2) 362(0.1) Emails 13,916(1.4) 9 (0.00)
C 35,975(3.7) 51,101(12.7) Scripts 12,357(1.3) 5,610(1.4)
C++ 33,024(3.4) 127,216(31.6) HTML 12,051(1.2) 2,892 (0.7)
EXE 26,704(2.7) 7,722(1.9) Other 28,664(2.9) 14,099(3.5)
Table 3: Summary of attachment file types in MPGH and UC.
3.2 Injectors Classifier
Injecting code (e.g., in the form of a DLL) in a process is a widely-used method
to piggyback into the execution context of a process. While this technique can
aid programmers in the process of bypassing the restrictions of an operating
system [28], it is also used by legitimate programs (e.g., Anti Viruses).
We evaluate the classifier using K-fold cross-validation as described in §2.4.
We report the performance of our classifier using the average f-score measure[6].
Overall, our system reports an f-score of 91%. The model performs well on both
classes with 0.94 sensitivity (TPR). When comparing the two classes bias we
can observe a 0.11 FPR on the injector class and 0.03 FPR on the goodware
class which contributes to a specificity of 0.97. Figure 3 shows the ROC curve
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Fig. 3: Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve for the class of injectors
showing 0.98 area under the curve.
and summarizes the trade-off between the FPR and the FPR. Having both high
sensitivity and specificity rate translates to the classifier being able to identify
injectors as well as files that are not classed as injectors. However, obtained
FPRs indicate that our classifier is better at identifying what is not an injector
(our goodware, negative class). If appropriately built into an automatic analysis
system, our classifier could be used by anti-cheat analysts to quickly discard
newly uploaded files that are not of interest, reducing the number of files and
posts that need to be manually reviewed.
To better understand the classifier output, we run it against the set of 12,035
binary files for which we have information from the VT sandbox. From these,
45% were classified as injectors. We applied a set of heuristics to them to fur-
ther understand the output. For example, 512 (9.3%) of these files mention the
injection capabilities of the binary either in the thread title (418) and/or in
the filename of the archive where the binary is included (253). This provides
strong evidence that these files are actual injectors. Also, we confirm that some
binaries, although not released as general-purpose injectors, implement injection
capabilities. This is the case of an auxiliary tool used to change the MD5 hash
of the cheat process before it is analysed by the corresponding anti-cheat engine
to evade basic signature-based detection. Since this is done in runtime, the tool
needs to inject itself into the game process memory. Another example is one tool
that is (was) used to inject code in Flash processes and replace ActionScript
Bytecode (ABC) to abuse Flash-based games. This tool was first tagged as ma-
licious by some anti-virus vendors (and then allow-listed) due to its potential to
‘inject malicious code into SWF files14. Another example of such a file classified
as an injector is a tool called LeagueDumper15. This tool gets injected into the
League of Legends game client and stores memory components of the games’
process back to disk for analysis. While this tool is not directly used to inject a
game cheat, it helps cheat developers to analyse the game binaries (which are
encrypted with a custom packer to avoid this kind of behaviour).
14 https://community.mcafee.com/t5/Malware/quot-False-Artemis-4DD89AF63CF7-quot/
m-p/521383 Accessed on 10th May 2021
15 https://github.com/tarekwiz/LeagueDumper Accessed on 10th May 2021
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3.3 Forum analysis
In this section, we analyze the social aspects of the two underground communities
studied. We report about the demographics of the actors involved, including the
social relations of these actors and their interests in the marketplace section.
Demographics As seen in Table 2, the forum dataset is comprised of more
than 511K and 184K members in MPGH and UC respectively. However, only
a small proportion of these are involved in the actual provision of cheats. We
consider a cheat is provided if: i) the attachment contains a binary file (e.g. DLL
or EXE) and ii) the attachment is released on a game board. We found that
4,522 actors on MPGH (0.9%) and 2,476 on UC (1.3%) have shared at least
one attachment in gaming forums. Figure 4 shows the distribution of actors
according to the number of attachments and the number of games where these
attachments are shared. A large proportion of authors have shared more than
one attachment (around 51% in MPGH and 42% in UC). Also, around 8% of
users in MPGH (377) have provided more than 10 attachments (and indeed, a
single actor provides a total of 290 attachments). This shows that, while many
users participate in the sharing of cheats, the majority of the cheats are shared
by a small subset of the community. We also see differences in the specialization
of users. Left-hand plots in Figure 4 show the different games for which actors
have shared attachments (we only consider those actors providing more than 2
attachments). We observe that most users (65% in MPGH and 60% in UC) are
specialized in a single game (e.g. we see a single user in MPGH who has shared
218 different attachments in just one game, or one actor that has shared 286
attachments in just two games). However, there are users that are not specialized
in particular games, and indeed we find that UC users tend to be less specialized,
with some users sharing attachments in up to 17 different games.
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Fig. 4: Distribution of actors by number of attachments (right) and games (left)
in MPGH and UnknownCheats (UC).
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Marketplace activity Our analysis is focused on data that is publicly re-
leased in the forums. Nevertheless, it is well known that users in underground
forums do share material related to cybercrime activities for free in order to
increase their reputation and thus gain an advantage against competitors in the
marketplace [15]. Also, underground forums have become improvised market-
places of all sorts of virtual and online goods [20, 27, 24], and indeed MPGH
has a set of sub-forums dedicated to trading. Estimating the actual volume of
sales/benefits of a particular user is challenging — most of the actual trades
occur by means of private messages and chats. However, the info gathered from
these users in the market-related forums serves as a good estimation of the finan-
cial activity of these users. Accordingly, we have analyzed the number of posts
made in the marketplace by the actors in MPGH that have released at least
one binary attachment in gaming forums. Table 4 shows the number of actors
posting and the total posts written in marketplace-related sub-forums. It can
be observed that the most popular forum among cheat providers is about sell-
ing accounts/keys/items. This confirms that cheat providers are also engaged in
Real Money Trading, which is a well-known practice to monetize cheats, either
individually or as part of a gang or Gold Farming Group (GFG) [18]. Two other
popular sub-forums are Giveaways and Scammer Grave. The former is typically
used by forum users to increase their reputation and popularity by offering free
goods, services, and even cryptocurrencies. The latter is a miscellaneous forum
for reporting and discussing scams. The fact that cheat developers are report-
ing or discussing scams is another indicator of them being engaged in trading.
Table 4 compares the activities of cheat providers with the top 100 actors accord-
ing to the number of injectors released. Overall, we see that top cheat providers
have higher interaction in the marketplace than the injector providers. Also, we
observe that, rather than selling actual goods, in general, injector providers are
more active in the Giveaway section. This might be due to the fact that we
classify these actors by looking at the injectors that have been released for free
(recall from Section 2.1 that we do not pay for these products and thus all the
analysis is based on freely available attachments). Also, we see that 12 of these
actors are actively engaged in the trading of eBooks, with an average of around
92 posts per author on this board.
Social relations Finally, we analyze the influence or popularity of users pro-
viding cheats and providing injectors in the entire community. For such purpose,
we apply Social Network Analysis using the techniques described in §3.3. First,
we build the graph of the two communities, MPGH and UC. Then, we compute
the in-degree centrality metric of all the users in each forum, which indicates,
for a given user, how many replies he/she has received, and from how many
peers. Then, we compute three ranks: RA, RI and RN . The first one ranks the
actors based on the number of cheats released, the second one ranks them based
on injectors, and the latter ranks actors based on their popularity in the com-
munity, derived from network centrality measures. For each actor we calculate
the quartile within each rank, so we can compare whether higher positions in
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All actors Top 100 injector providers
Forum P/A #Actors #posts P/A #Actors # posts
Selling Accounts/Keys/Items 31.14 1,278 18.10% 17.90 40 8.94%
Giveaways 49.42 886 19.91% 25.79 43 13.85%
Scammer Grave 51.70 651 15.31% 39.64 33 16.33%
Buying Accounts/Keys/Items 11.06 603 3.03% 2.35 20 0.59%
User Services 18.68 597 5.07% 12.09 23 3.47%
Trade Accounts/Keys/Items 8.21 488 1.82% 7.36 14 1.29%
eBooks For Sale 24.44 358 3.98% 92.08 12 13.80%
Marketplace Talk 14.86 335 2.26% 6.00 11 0.82%
Elite* 9.37 320 1.36% 3.15 13 0.51%
Marketplace Price Check / Questions 7.37 306 1.03% 15.38 13 2.50%
OTHERS (38) 11.86 3,828 28 % 13.90 153 37 %
TOTAL 48.62 4,522 219,854 80.10 100 8,010
Table 4: Activity of cheat providers in terms of number of posts and average
posts per actor (P/A) in each sub-forum. *Marketplaces for specific games.
one rank correspond with higher positions in the other rank. Figure 5 shows the
relations between the quartiles for the three ranks RA, RI and RN (denoted
QAi, QIi and QNi for i ∈ [1, 4] respectively). It can be observed that most of
the users that are in the first quartile of RA are also in the first quartile of RN ,
in both MPGH (55%) and UC (53%). This indicates that cheat providers are, in
general, popular in their corresponding social network. A similar pattern can be
observed for those providing injectors, though with a lower difference (39% and
34%n MPGH and UC respectively). However, there are also various actors which
are popular and influencing users (i.e., from QN1), and share a few cheats and
injectors, or don not share at all. Note that these forums are not used only for
trading, but also for exchanging knowledge and meet peers. Thus, being socially
influencing is not a sign of being a cheat provider. Instead, we observe that the
free provision of cheats and injectors allows users to increase their popularity in
the community.
4 Related Work
Underground communities Underground forums serve for the sharing and
trading of illicit products and services, and also for exchange of knowledge [20].
Due to the anonymity and the sense of lack of prosecution, they are an attractive
source for initiating into cybercrime activities [22, 24]. Research on such forums
allow to understand both old forms of cybercrimes, e.g. hacking [1, 20] or game
cheating [14], and also new forms of online fraud, such as e-whoring [15].
Previous works showed that cheating can be contagious within these commu-
nities, even when there is a clear social penalty associated with this practice [2,
32]. The pathways into video-cheat gaming hacking were studied by Hughes et
al., who analyzed the relationships of actors that are engaged both in general
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Fig. 5: Relation between number of users in each quartile according to num-
ber of attachments (QA, left-side), the number of injectors (QI, right-side) and
popularity of the users in the social network (QN)
hacking and cheat development [14]. Fields et al. analyse cheat sites created
for Whyville.net, an online gaming site to play casual science games [11]. They
highlight the difference between hacks and cheats; and talk about the different
types of online forums and their importance in the online gaming culture. Their
work uses Grounded Theory [13] and was limited to a single community and
100 posts, which were visited weekly by the researchers to capture data for the
study. In our work, we conduct quantitative analysis of two online communities
with more than 7M posts overall, and also analyse the attachments shared by
forum actors.
Cheat Detection Machine learning classifiers based on static and dynamic
analysis features have been widely proposed in the security domain for malware
detection [23, 5, 16, 7]. Other works have explored the use of machine learning
to detect cheats based on the behavioural features exhibited by the players. Liu
et al. proposed a method that uses bait targets as honeypots to detect aimbot-
based cheats [19]. They performed a field measurement of two games, Counter
Strike 1.6 and CS:GO. During one month and two weeks with 440 connections,
they were able to identify 43 aimbots. More recently, Witschel and Wressnegger
demonstrated that aimbots that introduce randomness while mimicking user
improvement are capable of evading commercial anti-cheats [31]. Outside the
academic world, some game developers, also provide updates on how their own
games are affected by cheaters. In May 2020, Koskinas and Paloetti provided an
update on the different cheats that were being reported and detected on League
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of Legends and other games from developer Riot Games [17]. They show how
they have improved their capability to detect and remove cheaters (from 4%
of games in 2015 to 1% of the players in 2020) and how cheaters are better
at identifying and reporting other cheaters while playing. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first academic work that proposes static and dynamic
analysis of binary files to detect injectors used for video-game cheating.
5 Discussion & Conclusions
Limitations. Our measurement spans across two of the most popular online
communities dedicated to video-game cheating and covers more than 200 games
through multiple years. Our work mainly focuses on the analysis of binary files
and we do not study how cheats are developed. The analysis of source code files
and other scripts could provide valuable insight into the development process,
but it is outside the scope of our work. Likewise, our work focuses on analyzing
injectors for Windows-based games. We note however that not all game cheats
affect Windows-based games. For instance, Pokemon Go, the 8th game within
terms of number of cheats releases and it is only available on mobile platforms
(Android and iOS). While our implementation can not currently analyze these
files, our methodology is agnostic to the platform. Due to the nature of the
features we use, our classifier is based on the features that these binaries exhibit
today. As it happens in other domains, such as malware [16], these may change in
the future as cheaters adapt to new detection techniques (e.g. Riot’s Valorant16).
While concept drift is outside of the scope of this work, the video game ecosystem
provides additional data points (e.g. user-reports) that could be used to detect
when the classifier becomes outdated and needs to be retrained.
Conclusions. In this work, we have performed a large-scale measurement of
two online forums focused on video game cheating. Our study shows that these
forums are widely used to distribute video game cheats, 40K since 2017 and
that the majority of these cheats are developed by a small number of contrib-
utors that, in most cases, are specialized in a single game. Our results show
that there is also a strong cooperation between the members of the community,
which sometimes is promoted by financial incentive (i.e. selling cheats, etc. on
marketplaces within the forum). Through our exploratory analysis we identify
that cheat injectors are an important component gearing the cheating industry,
but we also see that this is the weakest point of this economy. Thus, we develop
a method to systematically detect injectors uploaded to the forum using both
static and dynamic analysis features. Our classifier, which achieves a sensitivity
of 0.94, could be used by anti-cheat analyst to quickly identify new injectors
uploaded into these communities. Considering that between 2018 and 2020 the
average number release posts per day was 7 (for each forum), using our classi-
fier could help reduce the workload of the analyst when inspecting these new
releases, preventing new cheats from becoming widespread within their games.
16 https://support-valorant.riotgames.com/hc/en-us/articles/360046160933
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A Analysis Features
This appendix lists the feature categories used to train the injector classifier
along with the number of features within each category. The first column de-
scribes the feature category each analysis is part of as seen on Table 1.
Analysis name Number of features
File Operations
files opened 3,938
files deleted 1,817
files copied 955
files dropped 589
files written 432
files attribute changed 337
Registry Changes
registry keys opened 2,722
registry keys set 2,603
registry keys deleted 115
Processes & Mutexes
processes terminated 321
processes created 311
processes injected 12
processes killed 1
processes tree 1
mutexes opened 103
mutexes created 352
Services
services opened 33
services started 6
services created 3
services stopped 1
services deleted 1
Functions
modules loaded 338
calls highlighted 53
signals hooked 7
Strings
text highlighted 4,560
crypto plain text 601
Other
command executions 155
windows searched 40
permissions requested 13
crypto algorithms observed 2
ip traffic 1
windows hidden 1
memory pattern domains 1
memory pattern urls 1
Table 5: Detailed categorization of features used for the injector classifier.
